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Report: Collision with container likely cause of ship loss
The Bureau of Investigation and Analysis for Maritime Accidents (BEAmer) has published its report on March 16, 2026, concerning the sinking of the"Ablette", based in Les Sables-d'Olonne, which occurred on May 13, 2025. The trawler probably struck a container, causing a leak and subsequent total loss of the vessel. The ship, with two crew members on board, had departed from Les Sables-d'Olonne on May 12, at 6.30 a.m. bound for O Freixos Outes, Galicia, to undergo maintenance work at a shipyard. The crossing was expected to take 32 to 34 hours. The captain set a course of 240° at 9.8 knots. The sea was calm, and a 10-knot wind was blowing from the southwest. The two men shared the night watches, and the captain went to rest around 11:00 p.m. On May 13, at around 3:00 a.m., the captain made a check of the engine room and noted nothing unusual.. Around 5:30 a.m., the two men were on the bridge. The sea was calm, and the vessel was operating normally. At 9:10 a.m., the captain was on watch on the bridge when a jolt was felt. He immediately slowed the vessel. The two men left the bridge but saw nothing on the water. The impact occurred at pos. 45°26’18 N - 004°21’40 W. Approximately five minutes after the impact, the "high engine room flooding" alarm sounded. The captain went down to the engine room and saw a breach on the starboard side amidships (at frame 15), about 80 centimetres above the ballast tank ceiling. The breach was about 10 centimetres wide, and a powerful jet of water was directed aft. The water had already reached the bottom of the flywheel. The captain closed the fish hatch, opened the suction in the engine room, and started the two bilge pumps on the engine room's electrical panel. The water, however, continued to rise, and the captain observed that the pumping was not enough to stop the flooding. He then went back up to the bridge to inform the first mate that they needed to prepare to abandon ship. The captain decided to launch the life raft and equip it with a handheld VHF radio and emergency beacons. He went back down to the engine room, but the ship was now listing at nearly 20 degrees, and the water had risen to the first rung of the ladder. To avoid electrocution, he didn't risk going any further due to the presence of the 380-volt electrical transformer on the starboard side. The captain went back up to the bridge to make distress calls on the SSB radio and VHF channel 16. Receiving no response, he activated the distress calls on SSB and VHF using DSC. The men then donned their survival suits and boarded the life raft at 10:30 a.m. They moved away from the ship and awaited rescue. At 10:50 a.m., a customs aircraft flew over the raft. The captain still had visual contact with his vessel. It was listing and white smoke was billowing from it. The cargo m/v 'FWN Sun', which arrived on the scene, rescued the men at 11:15 a.m. At 11:40 a.m., the RAFFUT SAR helicopter from the Cazaux airbase hoisted the two sailors aboard and transported them to the hospital in Arcachon. After an evaluation, they left the hospital and returned to Les Sables d'Olonne on their own. The BEA Mer (French Maritime Accident Investigation Bureau) established the sequence of events leading to the accidents, namely: Collision with an unknown object Uncontrolled water ingress Within this sequence, the so-called disruptive events (decisive events that led to the accidents and were deemed significant) were identified. These were analysed by considering natural, material, human, and procedural elements in order to identify the factors that contributed to their occurrence or that aggravated their consequences (contributing factors). Among these factors, those that revealed safety problems presenting risks for which existing safeguards were deemed inadequate or lacking were highlighted (safety gaps). Factors without influence on the course of events were excluded, and only those that could, to a significant degree, have influenced the unfolding of events were retained. - The ship was underway at 10 knots in open water; - the crew saw nothing, either before or after the impact. - Immediately after the event, the captain observed: - a breach approximately 10 to 15 cm wide; - a powerful jet of water directed aft. Two hypotheses could explain the flooding of an engine compartment: - a leak in the seawater cooling system; - an opening in the hull to the outside. The possibility of a rupture in a component of the seawater cooling system could be ruled out. Indeed, the captain clearly saw a water ingress, which he was able to locate perfectly. It was located in an area of the hull without lining, and therefore immediately visible without further investigation. The French Maritime Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA Mer) commissioned a naval architecture firm to study various hypotheses for a collision with an unidentified floating object (UFO). The study showed that the damage caused by the collision with a submerged container corresponded to a breach caused by a puncture in the hull. Therefore, the hypothesis of a breach caused by the impact of a sufficiently dense object with sharp edges, most likely a container, was the most probable cause of the leak. Upon detection of the water ingress in the engine room, the captain started the main electric bilge pump, with a pumping capacity of 30 m³/h, and the backup electric bilge pump, also with a pumping capacity of 30 m³/h. He had carefully positioned the bilge system by isolating the fish hold and opening it up to the engine room. The pumping capacity was therefore at its maximum with the available equipment. This represented a maximum capacity of 60 m³/h, excluding pressure losses due to friction. Estimated flow rate of the water ingress: Q = 3600 × S × √(2 × g × h) Q = flow rate of the water ingress in m³/h S = surface area of the breach in m² g = acceleration due to gravity in m²/s² h = height below the water surface in m 11. If we consider the breach to be a puncture corresponding to an equilateral triangle with sides of 10 cm, its surface area is 0.0043 m². Since the breach was located approximatelyone metre below the waterline, the flow rate of water entering the compartment was therefore 69 m³/h, which was above the ship's pumping capacity. The water could only flood the engine room. When the captain decided to abandon ship, he took care to close off access to the engine room. Access to the fish hold was via a direct companionwa, which allowed the crew to reach it using a ladder. This access was made watertight by a lockable hinged hatch. The fish crates were lowered into the fish hold through a hatch, closed by a full-deck hatch. This hatch was lockable by means of a crossbar that was secured from the inside with two wing nuts. This device preventedthe hatch from opening unexpectedly and also avoids crushing the watertight seal. The crew had therefore to lock the fish hold hatch from inside the hold, then ascend via the direct access, and seal this access by locking the hatch with the cleats. Before setting sail, the locking of hatch (2) was not checked. In practice, hatch (2) was not locked at sea. When the vessel reached a list of more than 20°, it was likely that the fish hold hatch opened, allowing water to rush into the main deck and flood the fish hold. The flooding of the engine room and then the fish hold probably led to the sinking of the vessel. It should be noted that the shipowner provided the BEA Mer (French Maritime Accident Investigation Bureau) with a report indicating that the pressure exerted on the watertight door located between the engine room and the hydraulic room could have contributed to the progressive flooding of the latter and contributed to the loss of the vessel. This hypothesis was not the one favoured by the BEA Mer; the flooding of the engine room and then the fish hold was is the determining factor in the loss of the vessel.
Fishing vessel sank after water ingress and fire, crew rescued
The 'Ablette', with two crew members on board, suffered water ingress and subsequently caught fire in the Bay of Biscay off the Gironde coast on the morning of May 13, 2025. At 9:36 a.m., the CROSS Etel received a distress alert by VHF from a fishing vessel 120 miles west of the Gironde, and immediately launched "a May Day, enabling the mobilization of the Beechcraft customs aircraft, the Spanish hospital ship 'Juan de la Cosa' and the cargo m/v 'FWN Sun' (IMO: 9721669) besides the Raffut SAR helicopter from the Cazaux air base. The two fishermen were finally picked up by the 'FWN Sun', which was en route from La Rochelle to Gibraltar, from a life raft. The Raffut SAR helicopter then hoisted the castaways and transferred them to the Arcachon health center, where they were treated at 1:20 p.m. The pelagic trawler had left the port of Les Sables d'Olonne' on May 12, en route to Spain, where it was scheduled to arrive at a Galician shipyard for repairs. The voyage was expected to take approximately 40 hours.
Medevac off La Rochelle
On Aug 02, 2016 at 2:42 p.m., the CROSS Etel was contacted by the Toulouse Maritime Medical Consultation Centre to report an injured sailor aboard the "Ablette". The trawler was 149 nautical miles southwest of La Rochelle. Following a conference call with the Maritime Medical Consultation Centre (MMCC) in Toulouse, the Maritime Medical Coordination Pyrenees-Atlantic, the decision was made to evacuate the injured by helicopter to the hospital in Bordeaux. A Cheetah Yankee helicopter of the Navy base in La Rochelle was on scene at 5:10 p.m.. The injured was hoisted aboard the helicopter. At 6:15 p.m. he was delivered to the hospital personnel.
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