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While anchoring off Starikov Island, Kamchatka, the 'Kapitan Shcherbakov', with 24 people on board, suffered a strong water ingress in the engine room on the evening of Oct 29, 2026. The pumps couldn't cope with the flooding, and the ship experienced a blackout. The rescue ship 'Suvorovets' was deployed to assist by the MRCC in Kamchstka. It took the ship in tow to Petropavlovsk- Kamchatsky, where it was anchored in pos. 53° 13' N 159° 30' E. An emergency generator supplied the vessel, which was carrying 3000 tons frozen onions. The authorities in Kamchatka launched an investigation into the incident.

Fatigue, poor communication and a failure to follow safety procedures contributed to a boiler explosion aboard the 'Olivia', sailing as 'Bao Shine' since Aug 2025, on May 24 that year in Bluff, which seriously injured two crew members and hurt a third, investigators of the Transport Accident Investigation Commission have found out in their final report. The crew cleaned the boiler while it was still hot and after repeated failed attempts to restart it. The blast threw all three members of the night shift backwards. A third engineer and motorman suffered serious burns to their faces and arms, while a fitter suffered bruising to a shoulder. The 'Olivia' had been berthed at South Port in Bluff for 32 days while undergoing extensive repairs to its main engine and generators. Maritime New Zealand had prevented the vessel leaving port until repairs were completed and the cause of the machinery damage identified. The ship’s boiler flamed out late on May 23, and engineers made several unsuccessful attempts to restart it. One restart attempt caused an earlier blowback, sending soot and hot air through the burner intake and triggering a fire alarm. Nobody was injured. Hours later, the night shift began cleaning soot from inside the boiler. The crew proceeded without a documented assessment of the risks posed by residual fuel, heat and the introduction of compressed air. The motorman used an air lance to blast soot from the boiler tubes before directing compressed air into the furnace, where white smoke and glowing material had been visible. As the lance was withdrawn, an explosion occurred at 2.55 a.m. It was likely the motorman disturbed heated soot, igniting residual fuel in the boiler and causing the blowback. Zthe boiler had not been allowed to cool to an objectively verified safe temperature before compressed air was introduced. The senior engineers were very likely fatigued after sustained work on the vessel’s generator repairs. The engineering team had been operating 12-hour shifts, but some senior crew were also working outside those hours. The 2nd engineer was still helping troubleshoot the boiler about five hours after his day shift had ended. The vessel’s superintendent had also worked 21 hours during one period before resting for four hours and returning to work. The timing and circumstances of the call between the night shift 3rd engineer and the chief engineer very likely hindered clear communication and shared understanding of the proposed work and required controls. The chief engineer, who had been asleep when called, believed they had approved cleaning of the burner nozzle, while the night shift engineer understood that the permission had been given to clean soot from inside the boiler. The operator’s safety management system contained controls for unplanned work and boiler maintenance, but they were not consistently followed. The crew treated boiler cleaning as a familiar task, despite the conditions being significantly different from normal cleaning carried out after a boiler had cooled for several days at sea. No formal toolbox meeting, task-specific risk assessment or job hazard analysis was carried out before the work. The three crew members were wearing coveralls, safety shoes and gloves, but no face or eye protection. It was very likely the severity of the injuries would have been reduced if appropriate face protection had been worn. The commission also found the operator’s safety management system did not provide sufficient guidance for managing crews during sustained periods of intensive work, leaving the night shift without a senior engineer able to supervise higher-risk tasks. Fleet Management Limited has since reviewed its safety system, fatigue and risk assessment procedures, PPE requirements and management of prolonged maintenance periods. It has also issued a fleet-wide safety memorandum and developed a boiler safety warning for display aboard its vessels. The TAIC made no new recommendations, saying the action already taken by the operator had addressed the safety issues identified.

On Oct 30, 2026, Oman has evacuated 25 crew members from the 'Riti', after it ​was targeted ​and caught fire 1.6 ⁠nautical miles ​off the coast ​of Musandam. The navy, ​in coordination with the ‌Maritime ⁠Security Centre, carried out the evacuation and provided ​the crew ​with ⁠the necessary medical careThe incident remained under investigation, and no group has been officially attributed responsibility.

The insurer of the 'Villa de Pitanxo', along with the shipowner Pesquerías Nores Marín and the captain Juan Padín Costas, have proposed a total financial compensation of €6.2 million to the families of 20 sailors who died in the shipwreck. This offer was for those who have properly demonstrated their right to claim compensation following the accident. The proposal also included a specific payment of over €123,500 for Samuel Koufie, the sole survivor of the shipwreck. The compensation amounts varied, depending on the degree of kinship and the damages proven by each claimant, demonstrating an individualised assessment of the personal circumstances of each affected family. Sources from the law firm Amya Abogados, which represents the three parties involved, have indicated that the shipping company has intended to "resolve the families' claims from the outset, regardless of the existence of civil and criminal liability." However, the final resolution has been delayed because some affected parties have not submitted the required documentation or have done so incorrectly. The company was also facing obstacles stemming from the "excessive demands of many claimants." For their part, the families of the deceased have stated that they "continued to seek justice" and that they wanted "those responsible to be held accountable," emphasising the emotional and legal dimensions of the case. The complexity in processing the claims has stemmed from the requirement that each family member provide rigorous documentary evidence to justify their right to payment. Despite the efforts made by the shipowner and the insurer, not all those entitled to compensation have satisfactorily met this requirement. Furthermore, the existence of several claims with amounts and conditions that some sources describe as excessive has further complicated the negotiations, hindering the completion of the process. Meanwhile, the legal representation has maintained its objective of resolving the situation without waiting for the conclusion of any potential investigations or legal proceedings regarding criminal or civil liability.

The KM 'Lawit' allided with the pier at Ippi Port, Ende Regency, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), on the morning of Oct 29, 2026, while attempting to dock. The ferry suffered damage at the portside foreship, and also the pier was damaged. The 'Lawit' had previously sailed from Waingapu Port to Lewoleba Port and called at Ippi Port. The Pelni Ende Branch along with the Ende Class IV Harbourmaster and Port Authority Office (KSOP), were investigating the incident. A thorough inspection was conducted, both of the ship and the dock facilities at Ippi Port. Report with photo and video: https://flores.tribunnews.com/ende/66972/breaking-news-km-lawit-tabrak-dermaga-pelabuhan-ippi-ende#goog_rewarded https://x.com/Metro_TV/status/2116066166032744894/video/1