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Dutch Safety Board investigated collision of tug and tanker
The collision between the tug 'VB Seal' and the 'Gulholmen' on the Nieuwe Waterweg was caused by a combination of factors, including limited visibility, insufficient use of radar and electronic charts, and differing expectations regarding the tug's position and role. This was the conclusion of the Dutch Safety Board (OVV). The Safety Board investigated the roles of three parties involved in the collision, the tug, the tanker and the Vessel Traffic Service, which had a different perception of the situation, meaning the developing danger was not recognised in time. The tug's crew believed they were positioned safely outside the shipping channel, whereas the VTS and the pilot assumed the tug would remain clear of the fairway or assist the tanker. On Feb 23, 2025, at 01:49 a.m. the harbour tug 'VB Seal' was waiting near buoy 'Maas 5' on the Nieuwe Waterweg. The tug was scheduled to assist an inbound container ship and was waiting outside the shipping channel. Visibility was limited due to dense fog. Partly because of the heavy fog, the tug's crew did not realise that the vessel was slowly drifting out of position due to the ebb current and wind, eventually entering the track of the 'Gulholmen'. The tanker was unable to take evasive action, resulting in a collision. At the time of the collision, visibility was less than 2,000 metres. The Port Authority issued operational updates on visibility via its visibility reporting service. When the tug captain departed the port around 00:30, visibility was still 14,100 metres. Conditions subsequently deteriorated rapidly: by 01:30 a.m., visibility was down to just 490 meters. The fog protocol—which comes into effect when visibility drops below 500 meters—was not yet active at the time of the collision. The fog protocol was activated at 01:55 a.m., but by then, the Port Authority was not yet aware of the collision that had occurred at 01:49 a.m. The tug had arrived at buoy Maas 5 at 01:47:30 a.m. and waited at the edge of the fairway, with its bow parallel to the fairway and facing against the direction of traffic. The buoy’s flashing green light was directly ahead of the bow and served as a visual reference point in the fog. There was still a wait of approximately 25 minutes before the container ship, the tug was to assist, would arrive. Due to the dense fog, radar, the electronic chart, and the gyrocompass were the primary aids to navigation. However, the tug’s crew also relied partly on the buoy’s visible light as a reference point. Driven by the ebb current and the wind, the tug pivoted around the buoy and drifted slowly toward the shipping channel. The crew did not notice this in time. Several crew members were present on the bridge, but the report indicated that there was no explicit assignment of responsibility for monitoring the radar, electronic chart, and gyrocompass. Consequently, the task of monitoring navigation fell effectively to the captain. Furthermore, the crew had been working together for a relatively short time and therefore lacked a well-established routine. A captain and a pilot were on the bridge of the 'Gulholmen'. At approximately 01:46 a.m., the tanker’s captain spotted the tug on radar and asked the pilot if it was intended for them. The pilot indicated that it was not, and that the tug was waiting for a vessel sailing behind them. The captain noted that, according to the navigation equipment, the passing distance would be virtually zero and asked on which side the tug would pass. The pilot replied that it was customary for tugs to wait on the south side of the fairway. Eight seconds before the collision, the pilot asked the tug via channel Storno 45 what it was doing. At that moment, the tugboat captain realided he was no longer positioned outside the fairway but was in the tanker's path. He attempted to take evasive action, but there was insufficient time and space to prevent a collision. Initially, the tug's position gave the tanker's captain and pilot no cause for concern; tugboats frequently waited in that location for assignments. The pilot advised the captain to proceed at full power. At the time, the speed was considered appropriate for the conditions. However, the combination of high speed and limited visibility meant there was little time to react to unexpected situations. The pilot expected the tug's crew to ensure the tug remained clear of the fairway. VTS For the VTS operator, the tugboat's position and movements, along with the tanker's speed, gave no cause for intervention. The tug was perceived as a vessel simply waiting near buoy Maas 5, and the tanker’s movement was viewed as normal for an inbound ship. As fog regulations were not yet in effect and there were no indications that the situation deviated from standard traffic patterns, no additional information was provided and no action was taken. The Dutch Safety Board (OVV) made a number of recommendations based on this report. Boluda Towage was recommended to ensure its crews undergo regular training in navigating in conditions of restricted visibility. Navigation in restricted visibility—or relying solely on radar—is not currently a standard part of Boluda Towage’s training curriculum; the OVV recommended incorporating this. Training should focus on the use of navigation instruments and a clear division of tasks on the bridge regarding navigation, communication, and position monitoring. The Port of Rotterdam Authority was advised to establish agreements with pilots and tug operators regarding safe operations in restricted visibility. These agreements should address safe waiting positions for tugs and a more flexible procedure for tugboat assistance, allowing assignments to be reassessed if conditions change. The Dutch Pilots' Organisation was recommended to explicitly address the desired speed and engine settings for restricted visibility during the pilot-master briefing, ensuring both parties share a common understanding of safe navigation.
Captain of tug fined for negligence after collision with tanker
On Aug 22, the Shipping Disciplinary Board has imposed a €600 fine on the captain of the tug 'VB Seal' (IMO: 9448188) in connection with the ith the 'Gulholmen' on Aug 23. The tug was moored near buoy Maas 5, awaiting the arrival of the container mv 'Maersk Iowa'. However, due to dense fog, the vessel unknowingly lost its position, drifting back towards the north and crossing the course of the incoming 'Gulholmen'. The collision followed shortly thereafter. The tug started taking on water and was pushed towards the shore by other vessels. This released so much CO2 that several people became ill. The Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT) accused the captain of not using the radar sufficiently to check his position. The Disciplinary Board followed this reasoning: although the radar was in use, the captain failed to determine whether the ship was maintaining its position. This would have prevented the 'VB Seal' from changing position. The captain, who retired three days after the incident, argued that he always acted carefully, had never previously had any problems with the authorities, and that other parties involved – such as the pilot and crew of the 'Gulholmen' – were also negligent. He argued for a warning at most. The Disciplinary Board rejected this. According to the ruling, danger to the crew's lives could not be ruled out, and the captain seriously breached his duty of care. The €600 fine must be paid within three months.
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