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Investigation report into rescue boat incident with three injured published
On July 23, 2026, the German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) has issued an investigation report into an incident where a rescue boat of the 'Seahake', with three crew members inside, descended uncontrollably during a training drill off Piraeus due to a winch defect on June 6m 2023. The drills involving the launching of the rescue boat were to take place while the tanker was at anchor. The preparatory measures had been carried out properly and without problems. Subsequently, the rescue boat, still unmanned at this stage, was lifted by its davit from the stowed position on the main deck, slewed outboard over the ship’s rail and lowered to bulwark height. Three crew members then boarded the boat from that position. Upon receiving the corresponding command, a member of the boat crew disengaged the brake on the rescue boat davit’s hydraulic winch by means of the cable-operated remote control and thus set the lowering of the boat in motion from a height of about ten metres. However, the lowering then proceeded significantly faster than technically intended. The boat approached the water surface at high speed and struck it with great force. The three people in the boat, which remained afloat, suffered injuries of varying severity, but none life-threatening. First aid measures were immediately initiated on board and shore-based assistance was requested. During the rescue operation, two of the injured crew members were transported ashore by helicopter and the third person by a Coastguard patrol boat for medical treatment. After both incorrect operation and obvious technical causes, such as externally visible material fatigue, had been ruled out as causes of the accident, the investigation focused on identifying the suspected technical cause within the launching appliance system for the rescue boat’s excessively rapid descent onto the water. With significant support from an expert, a defect affecting the winch on the rescue boat davit was identified; the defect had been facilitated by certain design characteristics and was considered the most probable cause of the accident. In order to inform the public as promptly as possible about the findings, a lessons learned document was published on May 2 2024. The investigation concluded that the accident was caused by the long-term effects of corrosive sea air and moisture on the winch drum’s sealing and bearing system. Over the vessel’s service life, corrosion significantly damaged the bearing components. The accident was triggered, when a shock caused the freewheel’s locking mechanism to fail, resulting in the rescue boat’s near-free fall. During the descent, friction generated enough heat for one bearing to weld to the shaft, allowing the boat to be recovered after the accident. The freewheel had been incorporated into the winch to provide an additional function, enabling the repeated launching of liferafts or recovery of the release hook during a blackout. However, it was not capable of supporting manual recovery of the rescue boat because the required reduction gearbox was absent. As a result, the freewheel became a critical load-bearing component without redundancy. Its failure therefore led directly to the uncontrolled descent of the rescue boat. The investigation questioned whether the operational benefits of the freewheel justified the risks associated with its installation. It found that freewheels operating in harsh marine environments can become vulnerable to failure, particularly where they rely on friction rather than positive mechanical locking. The risk is further increased when the winch design does not permit routine inspection or maintenance of internal components. The report recommended examining alternative designs that eliminate the need for a freewheel. If a freewheel remains necessary, redundancy, such as a second parallel freewheel, should be considered. It also recommends designing the assembly to permit regular inspection and lubrication through improved accessibility and dedicated lubrication points. In addition, maintenance documentation should provide clearer guidance on the freewheel’s function and servicing requirements for both authorised personnel and the ship’s crew. The investigation found that the launching appliance had been certified despite not meeting the Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) Code requirement that the rescue boat be capable of manual recovery. The certification body disputed this conclusion, noting that prototype and onboard manual-operation tests had been completed in accordance with applicable international standards. The investigation maintained that, because the installed winch lacked a reduction gearbox, it was physically impossible to recover a fully loaded rescue boat using manual effort alone. Although this design deficiency represented non-compliance with the LSA Code, it was not considered a contributing factor to the accident. Consequently, no safety recommendation regarding the certification process was issued. The accident resulted from a concealed defect in the launching appliance’s freewheel module that would likely have been detected through proper inspections and functional testing. The findings underline the importance of thoroughly completing all inspection checklist items, including those relating to secondary functions such as manual recovery, rather than focusing solely on the primary hydraulic launching and recovery system. The ship’s safety management procedures did not address the freewheel’s function during inspections, maintenance or rescue boat drills. As a result, the corrosion-related defect developed over an extended period without being detected, while the requirement for manual recovery under the LSA Code also went unrecognised. The investigation concluded that deterioration of freewheel components should be regarded as an inherent system risk. Regular functional testing of the freewheel should therefore be incorporated into inspection procedures for life-saving appliances. The report also revisited the longstanding safety issue of conducting drills with rescue boats occupied during lowering. While lowering an unoccupied boat would eliminate the risk to personnel if the launching appliance failed, it would also prevent crews from practising essential emergency procedures from within the boat. Boarding after launch introduces separate hazards, including falls while using pilot ladders. As a practical compromise, the report recommended continuing the practice of first lowering the rescue boat unmanned to a safe height above the water before boarding. Using ballast to simulate the weight of occupants during the initial lowering could help identify equipment faults before personnel enter the boat, thereby reducing—though not eliminating—the risk during subsequent drills. The investigation recommended that manufacturers of lifeboat and rescue boat launching appliances be made aware of the design- and system-related risks associated with the use of freewheels in winch systems. Particular attention should be given to the potential for hidden defects and failures identified during the investigation. The operating company should review the inspection requirements for lifeboat launching appliances in its fleet’s safety management manuals, introduce procedures requiring regular checks of the proper functioning of freewheels integrated into launching appliance winches and revise rescue boat drill procedures by making it mandatory to first lower open boats unmanned to just above the water’s surface before boarding. It also recommends considering the use of ballast during the initial unmanned lowering to simulate the weight of an occupied boat and reduce the risk of equipment failure during crewed drills. The investigation recommended that organisations responsible for the inspection and maintenance of lifeboat launching appliances give particular attention to the safety risks associated with hidden defects in freewheel modules during servicing and inspections. Report with link to investigation report: https://safety4sea.com/bsu-investigation-uncontrolled-rescue-boat-descent-during-drill/
Three crew members medevaced off Piraeus
The Port Authority of Piraeus was informed on June 6, 2023, at midday that three crew members of the 'Seahake' aged 30, 23 and 53 years, needed immediate hospital treatment. The tanker was moored on Piraeus anchorage. A patrol boat immediately went to the scene and picked up the 30-year-old man, who was transported safely to the Zeas marina, from where he was transferred by an ambulance to the Piraeus General Hospital. Afterwards, a Navy helicopter took off, which picked up the 23-year-old and the 53-year-old men and transported them to the Elefsina military airport, where they were picked up by an ambulance and transported to the Piraeus General Hospital too.
Allision in Arkhangelsk
On May 29, 2016, the "Seahake" allided with the quay of berth 17 while mooring at the Oil Terminal in Arkhangelsk port. The ship hit with the aft starboard and damaged cargo piled up on the shore. Therre was no damage to the tanker. On May 30 a technical examination and repair of the affected loading arms was carried out.
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