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Report: Significant errors in radar monitoring contributed to the collision of the "Verity" and "Polesie"
Significant errors in radar monitoring contributed to the collision of the "Verity" and "Polesie" on Oct 24, 2023, in the German Bight, the German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) concluded together with British maritime accident investigators. The report, published on Aug 6, 2026, shed light on the matter. According to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), the "Verity" should have given way to the "Polesie," which was approaching from the Elbe River. However, the report stated that both freighters acted contrary to the COLREGs and the rules of good seamanship immediately before the collision, which could have been prevented if the radar monitoring center responsible for the area had acted according to its instructions. The center in Wilhelmshaven contacted both ships by radio only five minutes before the collision. The late intervention influenced the actions of the officers on watch on both ships and contributed to the collision. A radio message from Wilhelmshaven to the "Polesie" two minutes before the collision proved particularly fatal. In it, the navigator instructed the freighter to change course to starboard. However, this would have led it directly toward the "Verity." The implementation of the VTS's final instruction, which, in the VTS's view, should not have been given, made the collision unavoidable. Because of these incorrect instructions, the Federal Bureau also examined the situation at the Wilhelmshaven VTS more closely. Significant staffing deficiencies were documented at the monitoring center operated by the Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration. During the week of the accident, only two of the 21 shifts at the traffic control center were fully staffed with five people. The other 18 shifts each had one person missing. Four of the 30 positions were vacant. Neither the duty nautical officer responsible for the area at the time of the accident nor the nautical assistant worked according to the scheduled shift pattern. The nautical assistant, who was supposed to be monitoring the area of the "Verity" and "Polesie," was still engaged in radio communications with two other vessels. By the time he detected the dangerous approach of the two freighters, it was likely too late. The federal government is responsible for the staffing situation at the traffic control center. In 2023, the General Directorate for Waterways and Shipping (GDWS) applied to the Federal Ministry of Transport in Berlin for eight positions. However, as the GDWS stated in its report, the ministry only approved one position. Currently, the traffic control center in Wilhelmshaven still has a need for seven positions. Due to restrictions imposed by the federal government, the GDWS's staffing requests were reduced for the fiscal years 2024 to 2027. From 2024 to 2026, the ministry did not approve any positions at all, according to the BSU report. Full report: file:///C:/Users/TEMP.UNI-KIEL/Downloads/Stellungnahme_BSU_Untersuchungsbericht_5_26_MAIB.pdf
MAIB report - fatal collision was avoidable
The collision of the 'Polesie' with the 'Verity' was “wholly unavoidable”, according to the UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report into the incident. The 'Polesie' was bound for Spain from Hamburg, loaded with a grain of cargo, and the 'Verity' was on a journey to the UK from Bremen carrying a cargo of steel coils. The ships collided on Oct 24, 2023, at 04.55 a.m. in the German Bight. The 'Verity' began to sink by its bow, listed to starboard, then heeled severely. The ship sank within five minutes of the collision, a speed which did not allow the crew to prepare to abandon ship or deploy lifesaving appliances, the report said. When the 'Verity' was salvaged in two pieces the following year, the starboard side of the hull was found to have a large breach through number three side and double bottom ballast tanks and the ship’s single cargo hold. Three of the steel coils had punched through the cargo bulkhead and were found in the forwarded deck store and hold entrance shaft. The MAIB found that the actions of both vessels and the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) German Bight Traffic all contributed to the collision. While the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) do not stipulate “a safe passing distance”, the MAIB noted that the closest point of approach (CPA) for the two vessels was 0.19 nm when the 'Verity' entered the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), and never exceeded 0.53 nm despite course alterations by both ships. Court judgements give guidance on minimum safe passing distances of 1 nm when passing ahead and 0.5 nm when passing on reciprocal courses. The MAIB said the watchkeepers were willing to accept inappropriately close passing distances, and that when actions were taken to avoid a collision they were neither positive, made in ample time nor readily apparent to others. The first recorded evidence that a risk of collision had been identified was a VHF call to the 'Verity' from VTS at 0450 a.m., when VTS shared concerns over the very small CPA. "The 'Polesie'’s Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) showed that the Officer On Watch (OOW) was very passive in their monitoring of other traffic in the vicinity… it was not until after the VTS assistant’s first call to Polesie, which completed at about 0452, that the OOW selected Verity’s AIS icon on the radar” As the 'Verity' was lost, did not have a VDR and its OOW died, MAIB could not determine whether the ship’s OOW was aware of Polesie or actively monitoring the CPA. The investigators found that actions to avoid collision were made in small increments using the autopilot, limiting the rates of turn and making the actions harder to read by VTS and other vessels. Under rule 15 of COLREGs,The ' Verity' was required to take early and substantial action to keep clear of Polesie, but actions onboard both vessels contributed to the collision. In its immediate investigation following the incident, the MAIB had found certain key personnel were unwilling to co-operate with its investigation. "The key crew witnesses of Polesie, and the administrators of, and staff at, German Bight Traffic, could have provided critical evidence but were either unwilling or unable to, or prevented from expanding on their initial recollections, delivered in difficult circumstances, or providing other information to the investigators," the report said. Under German law, witnesses are entitled to not answer questions that might incriminate them, but MAIB stressed that its investigations are not to determine liability or apportion blame. When witnesses choose not to give evidence in incident investigations, lessons may be missed that could otherwise lead to regulatory and safety improvements. The MAIB said that recommendations had been made to both shipping companies to remind their ships’ crews to comply with COLREGs and the standards for keeping a safe navigational watch. The Isle of Man Ship Registry has been recommended to propose to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) extensions to the voyage data recorder carriage requirements, as Verity was not required to carry a VDR due to being under 3,000 GT and built before 2002.
Investigation has been completed
Almost two years after the collision of the "Verity" and the 'Polesie', the investigation into the accident has been completed. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in Southampton, UK, conducted the investigation with the support of the Federal Bureau of Maritime Accident Investigation in Hamburg. The report can be presented to the public in October at the earliest, as the parties involved now have 30 days to comment on the findings. The investigation by the Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office is still ongoing in parallel. Apparently, the two ships, the "Verity" coming from Bremen and heading for Immingham, and the "Polesie" coming from Hamburg, heading for La Coruña, attempted to evade the collision. However, the maneuvers of both ships could no longer prevent a collision, the Federal Bureau of Maritime Accident Investigation reported. The central focus of the investigation was why the two freighters noticed each other so late in the busy sea area. The Federal Bureau of Maritime Accident Investigation (BMI) attributed the lengthy investigation period to the complexity of the incident. In the weeks following the accident, the German side participated in the inspections on board the "Verity" and "Polesie" and participated in the interviews with all crew members. The wreckage was inspected, and data from the "Polesie"'s voyage data recorder, as well as radar and radio recordings from the Wilhelmshaven Traffic Control Center, were analyzed. The agency's comparatively limited staffing levels could also play a role.
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