Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz has deteriorated sharply since early March, evolving from intermittent disruption into a structurally constrained maritime chokepoint. LNG and crude oil shipping have been disproportionately affected, with vessel tracking data confirming a collapse in eastbound flows and a full rerouting of sensitive cargoes. By early April, Hormuz traffic patterns reflect not only security concerns, but a highly unstable regime of crossing permissions shaped by shifting security enforcement and bilateral alignment.
1. Traffic Collapse Since March
VesselTracker AIS data shows a step‑change in transit volumes beginning in early March, accelerating into April.
- Average daily crossings declined from more than 25 vessels in early March to approximately four by April 6.
- On April 6, only bulk carriers and LPG tankers were observed transiting the strait eastbound.
This contraction confirms a shift away from commercial normalization toward controlled, selective passage, consistent with VesselTracker observations of corridor avoidance and rising transit insecurity.
2. LNG: A Growing and Costly Trap
The LNG segment remains structurally exposed.
- 50+ LNG vessels impacted or effectively trapped inside the Middle East Gulf.
- At least 15 vessels are fully laden, incurring sustained cargo losses through boil‑off gas.
- Several vessels remain stationed in alternative waiting areas (Omani, Malaysian, and Indian Ocean approaches) pending route clarity.
Heading into the second quarter, LNG shipping rates are staying strong due to firm demand and tight logistics. Brokers are seeing a steady stream of inquiries for April and May from the U.S. Gulf and Nigeria, with top-tier vessels already securing rates around $120–125k per day (reported May subs).
3. Crude Oil: Movement, but with Filters
Crude oil flows have not ceased entirely, but they are now highly selective and structurally constrained at the export‑hub level.
Observed crude dynamics:
- 90+ crude oil tankers currently anchored within the Middle East Gulf.
- Only 16 laden crude tankers have successfully crossed Hormuz since the start of April.
- Crossings exhibit patterned alignment, with movements favoring east‑linked counterparties.
Beyond transit restrictions, export infrastructure is increasingly absorbing the stress. With Ras Tanura and Ju'aymah effectively blocked:
- Yanbu continues to function as the primary operational crude export port, acting as the main outlet while eastern terminals are constrained.
- Ras Tanura is currently operating at approximately 86.7% of its storage capacity, utilizing 28.33 million barrels out of a total 32.67 million barrels, leaving limited buffering capacity.
- Ju'aymah is operating at 100% of its storage capacity, indicating a fully saturated terminal with no near‑term flexibility.
- Basrah has not loaded any crude cargoes since early March, further tightening available export supply from the region and increasing pressure on alternative hubs.
4. Jet Fuel and the Cape Detour
One of the clearest structural signals in April is the complete rerouting of jet fuel cargoes.
- 100% of East‑to‑West jet fuel shipments are now routing via the Cape of Good Hope.
This shift confirms that refined products, particularly aviation fuels, are now treated as non‑insurable or operationally non‑viable through Middle Eastern chokepoints.
The first days of April have been marked by rapid‑fire negotiations, conflicting news releases, and increasingly decisive maritime tracking signals. What is now clear, is that the Strait of Hormuz is no longer merely disrupted; it is being functionally redefined. Vessel traffic data confirms a clear transition from temporary risk avoidance to sustained, strategic rerouting. LNG losses continue to accumulate, crude flows persist only under strict geopolitical filters, and refined products are beginning to bypass the corridor altogether.
This evolution points less to a momentary crisis and more to the emergence of a new operating baseline for global energy trade. Routing decisions, storage constraints, and selective access are reshaping flows well beyond the Gulf, transmitting inefficiencies across freight markets, price benchmarks, and regional supply balances. Unless conditions materially change, April may come to represent the point at which global trade does not simply adjust, but is structurally reshaped around constraint, selectivity, and longer‑term rerouting as permanent features rather than temporary responses.
