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The Resolve Marine was preparing for pulling operations for the final two portions of the stern of the ' MSC Baltic III', that remained in the water. The bow section of the 'MSC Baltic III' was fully ashore and removed from the beach. The one section of the vessel’s stern has been pulled ashore, deconstructed, and removed from the shoreline. Critically, the salvage operation reached six heavy fuel oil tanks, which were a priority to end the pollution risks. These tanks were cleaned and have been recycled. While intermittent oil sheening continued to be observed in Cedar Cove, it has significantly decreased since the bow section was removed from the water. The Canadian Coast Guard and Environment and Climate Change Canada continued to conduct shoreline, on-water, and aerial pollution surveillance and monitoring, weather permitting.  To date, the Resolve Marine has removed 9,282 tonnes from the wreck. It equated to approximately 84 % of the vessel's total tonnage. After the vessel has been salvaged, there was to be a final clean-up of the sea floor and coastline in Cear Cove. The Resolve Marine has also committed to coastline restoration as the final stage of the salvage operation. Report with photos: https://maritime-executive.com/article/salvage-of-the-msc-baltic-iii-wreck-prepares-to-remove-final-stern-sections

On Nov 9, 2026, the 'Sergio Gracia' (also identified as Sergio Gracia Aguilar), which had been out of service since 2018, was found partially submerged at one of the concrete docks of the Quintana Roo Integral Port Administration (APIQROO) terminal in Isla Mujeres. The incident caused a hydrocarbon leak and triggered a large-scale mobilisation of emergency services, put environmental authorities on alert due to the imminent risk of a disaster in the bay. Members of the Mexican Navy (Semar), the Port Authority, and municipal Civil Protection deployed to the site to address the incident. Given the threat of contamination to the seabed from the fuel spill, personnel from the Federal Attorney's Office for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) intervened directly in the area. Efforts were successfully made to recover and contain the fuel. The vessel had been moored for years alongside the ferry 'Isla Blanca' in a state of obvious disrepair. PROFEPA did not officially detailed the precise causes of the structural collapse. The main demand from the community and environmental authorities is now focused on requiring the prompt removal of the wreck and its relocation to a safe site that did not pose a permanent threat to the seabed off Isla Mujeres. Report with photo: https://enfoquenoticias.com.mx/noticias/alerta-ambiental-por-hundimiento-de-ferry-en-isla-mujeres

The transport safety watchdog has expanded its probe into steering issues on the 'Spirit of Tasmania IV' after the primary system failed on Nov 4, 2026. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) was already investigating an incident involving the 'Spirit of Tasmania V' during a trial voyage on Oct 24. During that incident, steering problems involving the autopilot briefly caused the ship to move outside the charted shipping channel limits off Geelong. The 'Spirit opf Tasmania IV' suffered its own steering issue, that resulted in a tug escorting the vessel to Geelong as a precaution, where the ferry berthed with a four-hour delay. When steering control was changed from the autopilot to manual mode (follow-up), the steering wheel did not respond to helm commands. Control was then changed to emergency non-follow-up to embark the pilot while the ship's engineers attempted to correct the fault. Once the pilot was on board, the ship aborted the entry to Port Phillip Bay to further investigate the issue. Further attempts to transfer steering to manual mode were unsuccessful. Subsequently, steering control was transferred to the bridge wing and central steering levers from where the ship was then steered. TT lines assured that all of the backup systems and procedures kicked into place, all of the protocols were followed, and the captain was always in control of the ship, and at all times passengers and crew were safe. It was not yet known if the steering issues on both vessels involved the same root cause. The TT-Line appointed an independent investigator to assess both incidents. The ATSB said the incident would now be included in a wider probe of the Oct 24 incident. The expanded investigation involved the download of both ships' vessel data recorders for the relevant voyages, examining the ships' equipment, interviewing involved crew and other relevant personnel, and analysing records and documentation, in line with the ATSB's highest investigation priority in the marine transport mode being occurrences involving Australian-flagged passenger vessels. The ATSB was s also investigating a third incident, in which the master of the 'Spirit of Tasmania I' was forced to abort the entry into Port Phillip Bay due to a position error on the ship's electronic chart display on Oct 15.

The Isle of Man Ship Registry has confirmed there will be no investigation into the death of Captain Mariusz Gladkiewicz, who was a longstanding Master of the 'Whitchallenger', on Oct 16, 2026. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) had listed the death of the man, who fell aboard the tanker, while it was docked in Southampton. The incident was listed as being at the preliminary assessment stage, but the Ship Registry has now confirmed no further investigation would take place after the death was attributed to natural causes. Local paramedics and the Coastguard had attended the vessel, and Gladkiewicz was subsequently confirmed deceased. The death has been confirmed as having occurred due to natural causes and therefore, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) would not be conducting a marine casualty investigation.

The transport safety watchdog has expanded its probe into steering issues on the 'Spirit of Tasmania IV' after the primary system failed on Nov 4, 2026. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) was already investigating an incident involving the 'Spirit of Tasmania V' during a trial voyage on Oct 24. During that incident, steering problems involving the autopilot briefly caused the ship to move outside the charted shipping channel limits off Geelong. The 'Spirit opf Tasmania IV' suffered its own steering issue, that resulted in a tug escorting the vessel to Geelong as a precaution, where the ferry berthed with a four-hour delay. When steering control was changed from the autopilot to manual mode (follow-up), the steering wheel did not respond to helm commands. Control was then changed to emergency non-follow-up to embark the pilot while the ship's engineers attempted to correct the fault. Once the pilot was on board, the ship aborted the entry to Port Phillip Bay to further investigate the issue. Further attempts to transfer steering to manual mode were unsuccessful. Subsequently, steering control was transferred to the bridge wing and central steering levers from where the ship was then steered. TT lines assured that all of the backup systems and procedures kicked into place, all of the protocols were followed, and the captain was always in control of the ship, and at all times passengers and crew were safe. It was not yet known if the steering issues on both vessels involved the same root cause. The TT-Line appointed an independent investigator to assess both incidents. The ATSB said the incident would now be included in a wider probe of the Oct 24 incident. The expanded investigation involved the download of both ships' vessel data recorders for the relevant voyages, examining the ships' equipment, interviewing involved crew and other relevant personnel, and analysing records and documentation, in line with the ATSB's highest investigation priority in the marine transport mode being occurrences involving Australian-flagged passenger vessels. The ATSB was s also investigating a third incident, in which the master of the 'Spirit of Tasmania I' was forced to abort the entry into Port Phillip Bay due to a position error on the ship's electronic chart display on Oct 15.